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Goodness, rational permissibility, and the like might be gruesome properties. 
That is to say, they might not well suit causal-explanatory purposes. Or at 
least, these properties are gruesome for all their normative concepts tell us by 
themselves. Perhaps hedonists are right and such properties are anything but 
gruesome, but perhaps instead, the most gruesome-minded ethical pluralists 
are right-normative concepts by themselves don’t settle the issue. At the end 
of his marvelous commentary, John Hawthorne depicts the morass of dank 
possibilities that a “moral realist” must enter when he tries explaining how 
normative words and thoughts could lock on to some particular causally grue- 
some property that constitutes being good. Right, I say, and expressivists can 
direct us around the morass. Then he asks why I avoid the questions that lead 
moral realists into this morass. But I don’t avoid them; I offer an answer. 
How do plan-laden terms and concepts pick out properties?l Not all by 
themselves, in a way that a theory of interpretation can explain on its own. 
Interpretation might identify a term as plan-laden, as meaning, say, “is the 
thing to do” in the special sense I stipulated for that phrase. Trivially, if 
that’s what the term means, then it picks out whatever property constitutes 
being the thing to do-but what property is that? What property it is, I say, 
is a question of what to do. It’s a question of what to do in general, of how to 
live. Come to a full plan for life, and you will have come to a view on what 
property constitutes being the thing to do. Will you have the answer right? 
Again, that’s not settled just by interpreting your words and concepts; that 
again is a question of how to live. It can be answered only in plan-laden 
terms. Does a term that means “thing to do” pick out the property of holding 
out maximal prospects for pleasure, as a normative hedonist would claim? 
That’s a question of whether to go for pleasure and pleasure alone. 
That is the account I offer. By stipulation, it applies to “plan-laden” terms 
like “thing to do”-if my stipulations are coherent. Does it apply as well to 
normative terms like ‘ought’ and ‘good’ in our actual language? I respond in 
I I mean, of course, one-place predicates and their concepts. Like questions arise for 
multi-place plan-laden predicates. 
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two stages: First, a “possibility proof’: I try to show that the planning 
language of “thing to do” is coherent. Second, support for the hypothesis that 
our normative language is plan-laden. 
Suppose first, then, that plan-laden language is a coherent possibility. 
Still, asks Hawthorne, why not stick with more standard accounts for the 
workings of language and just apply them to normative terms? Well, as he 
points out, orthodox accounts lead us into the morass. They leave us with the 
problem of causally gruesome properties: how one of these could possibly be 
what a normative term picks out. And in this morass lie other pitfalls: Stan- 
dardaccounts leave it a mystery why to do what you ought to do-whereas 
why to do it seems to be settled in settling that you ought to. Standard 
accounts don’t explain why, say, perfectionists and hedonists might both have 
the concept ought, and with full command of the natural facts, still 
disagree-and each understand what the other was saying. An account that led 
us around this morass would have advantages. 
That leaves the possibility proof and Hawthorne’s objections to it. First, 
though, let me address some of Hawthorne’s worries about how I’m saying 
that plan-laden concepts work. He is right that I need to change what I say 
about natural properties and supervenience. I’ll stick to my claim, though, 
that aluminosity requirement belongs in the kind of idealization that will 
illuminate the nature and logic of planning and of normative concepts. 
What to do, then, if you see a ghost? Have your head examined, I would 
think. What, though, if the ghost is real? That’s not a serious question until 
we learn how you’re supposed to tell that it’s real-and if someone offers us 
an answer, our first question should be whether, confronted with that appari- 
tion, to conclude that it’s a real ghost you are seeing. What if instead you 
encounter a halo of goodness? We’d need to learn more about halos. If touch- 
ing a halo of goodness makes you go poof and turn into a halo too, the thing 
to do, I’d think, is to get away. 
Strange enough evidence might support strange conclusions: that there 
were more things on earth than are admitted by naturalistic philosophy. So 
yes, a universal plan may provide for what to do if the thing to conclude is 
that you are seeing a ghost. In this sense, it might provide for encountering 
ghosts-r even “halos of goodness”, when we learn what those are. Features 
of plans, then, I agree, can be couched in “objective” terms, in terms of what 
to do given a situation, like really encountering a ghost, apart from any ques- 
tion of how you’d know you were in that situation. Such plan fragments can 
be useful in our thinking; “Don’t cross the street when a car is coming” can 
be useful advice; even “Buy low and sell high” can be useful. And nothing in 
the logic of planning, I agree, precludes ghosts and halos in the objective 
situations for which we plan. The question of what you ought to do if you 
meet a ghost may be intelligible even if idle. On this, Hawthorne is quite 
right, and I need to speak more carefully than I have been doing. 
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Two claims I now want to make. First, planning how to cope with 
evidence is, in a sense, more basic that planning for objective situations you 
might be in. Second, when ghostly or haloly properties figure in planning, 
these aren’t “non-natural” in the sense that Moore found he needed. Moore 
argued that his objections to naturalistic ethics applied to theological ethics 
too; supernatural properties weren’t non-natural in the sense that c o h  
him. My central claims, put more cautiously than I did, should be these: (i) 
the plan-laden supervenes on that which is not plan-laden, and (ii) it is 
concepts, not properties, that are plan-laden or not. (I do think the only objec- 
tive situations we’ll ever encounter are natural ones, but that’s a matter of 
how the world is constructed, not of how plan-laden concepts work.) My 
hypothesis is that like claims hold for what’s normative or not: for ought and 
the like. “Naturalistic”, then, isn’t the right contrast with “normative “, I’ll 
agree. Perhaps “descriptive” is the best term for the non-normative side of the 
contrast, as Hare proposes-but that term is bound to be treacherous, with 
suggestions that I won’t want to embrace. What I am hypothesizing is that 
normative concepts need quite a different kind of explanation from naturalistic 
concepts, from supernaturalistic concepts, and from any other concepts that 
might be best explained in one of the ways that Hawthorne toys with. 
As for the concept of a “halo of goodness”, if it’s normative, then it won’t 
suit fundamental contingency planning. If the concept of a “halo” has built 
into it that halos are to be sought, then “Seek halos” is empty; to settle 
whether something counts as a halo, we must first settle whether to seek it. 
Counting something as a halo is then a deliverance of contingency planning, 
not an input. Alternatively, halos are recognizable apart from questions of 
what to do with them, and so the concept of a halo is non-normative: it is 
conceptually coherent to shun halos. In other words, I say the same thing 
about “halos of goodness” as I said about situational demands to bash a man. 
If, as a deliverance of metaphysics, genocide is surrounded by a halo of good- 
ness, still genocide is not a goal to pursue. I say this as a planner, and trust 
that you agree. 
Do normative claims express facts? In some ways yes and in some ways 
no. If Holmes ought now to pack, there’s a non-normative fact that consti- 
tutes this being so. I might be mistaken, though, about what that fact is, and 
yet not be making any conceptual or other non-normative mistake. The fact 
is a hedonic fact H, perhaps, and I’m a perfectionist who, moreover, thinks 
that H doesn’t obtain. I’m mistaken on how to live, and mistaken about H. 
Do I “express” this non-normative fact H that I deny? In a sense I do, 
perhaps, but in a sense I don’t. 
Back then to planning for objective circumstances. What to do if you’re 
about to cross the street and a car’s speeding toward you? Wait, is the answer. 
The question is couched in terms of one’s objective situation, and the answer 
seems obvious. Isn’t that, however, because it goes without saying how to 
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recognize such a plight? The full story, idealized to an extreme, consists in 
how to respond to evidence. “If a car’s coming, wait!” can amount to this: if 
the thing to think, given your evidence, is that a cur is coming, then wait! Can 
we understand plans for objective contingencies, except as fragments of 
evidentially based plans? “Save money” is often a good dictum. So, it seems, 
if your house isn’t going to burn down, don’t waste money on insurance. 
This plan is as implementable as any: that your house won’t burn down next 
week is a virtual certainty. But this is ridiculous, and so “Save money” can’t 
reasonably mean, “When it’s virtually certain that an act will save money, do 
it.” We’ll know what it does mean when we cash it out in terms of how to 
respond to evidence, including evidence of risks that are minimal. 
Speaking as I am speaking does, of course, involve a huge idealization. 
An ideally full, coherent plan, I’m saying, would be in terms of evidence and 
how to respond. Human wisdom isn’t like this, I agree; we can’t implement 
fully coherent plans, any more that we take a fully coherent survey of how 
things may stand for all we know. No evidence is fully luminous to us, 
perhaps. For purposes of logic, though, it is useful to look to coherent ideali- 
zations, even if for navigating life, we make do with rough heuristics. The 
logic of how things stand goes beyond our powers to keep track of the possi- 
bilities, and the like goes for plans. 
Two odds and ends: third person uses and akrasia. If I say, ‘The thing for 
Holmes to do now is to pack,” I express a contingency plan for being in his 
shoes. To accept this is to plan, for the contingency of being in Holmes’s 
exact subjective circumstances, to pack. (The story gets more complex when 
I’m uncertain what his subjective circumstances are, but here I’ll leave this 
thread dangling.) The akratic agent isn’t of one mind: in a way he accepts a 
plan, and in a way he doesn’t fully accept it. If I think I ought to leave now 
but I don’t, I don’t entirely accept that I ought to leave right this instant. 
I turn now to the most serious problem for the possibility proof, rejection 
or disagreement. First, instead of appealing to these notions, why not do 
logic by appealing to standard introduction and elimination rules? Well, I’d be 
happy if that works. It would make things easier-so long as we didn’t let i t  
lead us back into the morass. Dreier’s “hiyo” example, though, makes me 
think that this alternative won’t work; his moral is that we can’t always just 
invent a predicate and stipulate it to have a standard logic. The example led 
me to think that Stevenson had been right, and the possibility of disagree- 
ment is the key to logic. Not all kinds of rejection of a state of mind, though, 
constitute disagreeing in asense that could underlie logic. I used the wad 
“reject” in my derivation of a logic of planning, but as Hawthorne rightly 
points out, not every kind of rejection of a state of mind will fit my needs2 
Nicholas Unwin independently makes this point in “Norms and Negation: A Roblem for 
Gibbard‘s Logic”, Philosophical Quarterly 51, no. 202 60-75. 
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Can you disagree with a plan? “Ruling out” adopting it, I now agree, 
might not read as disagreeing with it; I might rule out adopting any plan 
whatsoever. Belief runs parallel: an agnostic of one kind rules out adopting 
any belief whatsoever as to whether God exists, ruling out agreeing and ruling 
out disagreeing that He exists. I need ruling out in the sense of disagreeing, 
where disagreeing with disagreeing amounts to agreeing. 
Can I agree or disagree with doing something? Mrs. Hudson calls the 
police, and Holmes, we might say, disagrees with what she does. If I disagree 
with Holmes on this, I regard calling the police, in her circumstances, as 
okay to do-as rationally permissible. If I disagree with not calling the 
police, I regard calling them as mandatory. Disagreement can explain the 
distinction between permissions and requirements. 
Whether there’s an attitude of disagreement that will do these jobs is a big 
question, and I won’t try to settle it here. Hawthorne (and Unwin) are right to 
identify this as the crux of whether expressivism will work. I hope it does, 
because I’d like to avoid the morass and see the Moore-like phenomena fall 
neatly out of a theory. 
I thank John Hawthorne for a clear and insightful commentary, one that 
has led me to rethink aspects of my position. 
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